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 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Laquan Kellam appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress 
evidence that was seized during his warrantless arrest and the subsequent warrantless 
search of his residence.  He also appeals his judgment of conviction and sentence.  We 
will affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Motion To Suppress Hearing1 
On three separate dates in June 2014, Detective David Lau of the Harrisburg 
Police Department organized controlled drug transactions using a confidential informant.  
On each occasion, Lau witnessed the informant call Kellam and engage in a brief 
conversation in which the informant arranged to buy crack cocaine at a certain location.  
Then, at that location, Lau video-recorded or photographed the controlled transaction.  
On each occasion, the informant returned with substances later confirmed by the 
Pennsylvania State Police Lab to be crack cocaine.  Based on those drug transactions, 
Lau determined that he had probable cause to take Kellam into custody, but he did not 
seek an arrest warrant.   
                                              
1  The facts recounted here derive from the suppression hearing testimony of 
Detective David Lau, which the Court credited over Kellam’s testimony at that hearing.  
See infra Section II.B.  We review factual findings for clear error.  United States v. 
Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 440 (3d Cir. 1997).  Our “review is more deferential with respect 
to determinations about the credibility of witnesses[.]”  Id. at 441.  “[W]hen the district 
court’s decision is based on testimony that is coherent and plausible, not internally 
inconsistent and not contradicted by external evidence, there can almost never be a 
finding of clear error.”  Id. 
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Approximately three weeks after the last controlled transaction, Lau was 
conducting surveillance at 3212 Green Street, the residence he had identified as 
belonging to Kellam and Kellam’s girlfriend, Ashley Smith.  Assisting Lau on that day 
were two Dauphin County sheriff’s deputies.  After observing Kellam exit the residence, 
and, based on the information developed from the three earlier drug transactions 
involving Kellam, Lau asked the two deputies to take Kellam into custody.  The two 
stopped Kellam nearby, and Lau arrived at the scene as they were effecting the arrest.   
Lau informed Kellam that the arrest was for crack cocaine sales, and he advised 
him of his constitutional rights, including his Miranda rights.  When asked whether there 
was anything on his person, Kellam was cooperative, telling Lau that he had three “eight 
balls” in his pocket, (App. at 11), which were each approximately three and half grams of 
separately packaged crack cocaine.  Lau asked Kellam if there was money, drugs, or 
weapons at the residence, and Kellam answered that there was “a lot.”  (App. at 13.)  Lau 
then asked for Kellam’s consent to go back to the house to recover those items.  Kellam 
agreed and said he wanted to cooperate and would take the arresting officers to his house.  
Lau did not obtain written consent for the impending search, nor did he seek a search 
warrant.   
Kellam was escorted in handcuffs back to the residence.  Upon arrival, he gave his 
key to Lau and told him to go ahead and go inside.  The law enforcement officers entered 
the kitchen and encountered Smith, who also consented to a search of the residence.  
Based on information provided by Kellam, Lau recovered about fifteen and a half ounces 
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of crack cocaine from a shoe box on a shelf in the kitchen, a gun in a holster from an 
upstairs bedroom, and cash in the bottom drawer of a dresser in that same bedroom.   
B. Procedural History 
A grand jury indicted Kellam for various drug charges.  More particularly, in a 
superseding indictment, Kellam was indicted on three counts of distribution and 
possession with the intent to distribute cocaine base (i.e., crack cocaine), in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), one count of possession with the intent to distribute 280 grams or 
more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and one count of possession 
of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).   
Kellam moved to suppress all of the evidence seized during his arrest and the 
subsequent search of his residence.  The District Court denied that motion.  It concluded 
that the controlled buys provided probable cause for Lau to believe that Kellam had 
committed a crime, and it found that Kellam had voluntarily consented to the search of 
his residence.   
After a two-day trial, a jury found Kellam guilty of all five counts in the 
indictment.  At trial, Lau testified to largely the same version of events that he had 
described at the suppression hearing.  See supra Section I.A.  He also testified as to his 
general experience in investigating drug crimes.  See infra note 3.  The confidential 
informant testified to buying crack from Kellam and helping Lau with the investigation.   
The District Court later held a sentencing hearing and sentenced Kellam to 181 
months’ imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and a $500 assessment.  A 
Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) was prepared and, as to the four drug counts, 
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recommended a criminal history category of I and a total offense level of 32, which 
included a two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice under the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “guidelines”) § 3C1.1 and corresponded to a 
guidelines recommended imprisonment range of 121 to 151 months.   
The PSR recommended the obstruction of justice enhancement for two reasons.  
First, after receiving the government’s pretrial discovery, Kellam identified the 
confidential informant, confronted him at his home, and persuaded him to record a 
statement with Kellam’s counsel that the three drug deals did not occur.  Second, Kellam 
lied under oath at the suppression hearing when he denied selling drugs or driving a black 
Nissan owned by Smith.  Video evidence and testimony at trial established that Kellam 
sold crack and drove the black Nissan when delivering crack to the informant.   
On the firearm count, the PSR recommended the statutory minimum of 60 
months’ imprisonment to run consecutively to the term of imprisonment for the drug 
offenses.  18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A), 929(a)(1); see also U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4(b) cmt.2 
(“Each of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 929(a) ... requires that a term of imprisonment 
imposed under that section shall run consecutively to any other term of imprisonment.”). 
Kellam timely appealed.   
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II.  DISCUSSION2 
Kellam raises two arguments challenging the denial of his motion to suppress, one 
argument challenging his conviction, and one argument challenging his sentence.  None 
are persuasive. 
A. The Warrantless Arrest 
 
Kellam says that the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress 
because the warrantless arrest was conducted by deputy sheriffs who were not authorized 
to effectuate the arrest.  He argues that, under Pennsylvania law, such deputies “may only 
make a warrantless arrest for felonies and breaches of the [peace] committed in their 
presence[,]”  (Opening Br. at 12), and, here, no crimes were committed in their presence.  
We decline to consider Kellam’s argument, however, because he never raised it before 
the District Court. 
“[A] suppression argument raised for the first time on appeal is waived ... absent 
good cause.”  United States v. Rose, 538 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2008).  In United States 
v. Joseph, we addressed “the degree of particularity required to preserve an argument” for 
appeal.  730 F.3d 336, 338 (3d Cir. 2013).  We said that a party must raise arguments, not 
issues, to preserve them for appeal.  Id. at 341.  An issue is a broad question or legal rule 
that can encompass more than one argument, while an argument is a contention, theory, 
ground, or basis.  Id. at 340. 
                                              
2  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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At the District Court, Kellam challenged the validity of the controlled transactions 
as a basis for probable cause to arrest him, but now on appeal, he presses a different 
argument – that the deputy sheriffs lacked legal authority to effectuate his arrest.  
Because that argument was not made to the District Court and because Kellam does not 
provide good cause for its omission, we deem it forfeited.  Kellam does not press the 
argument that Lau lacked probable cause for the arrest.   
B. The Warrantless Search 
 
Kellam next argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress 
evidence gathered during the warrantless search of the Green Street residence.   He says 
that his and Smith’s consent was involuntary or coerced, when considered under the 
totality of the circumstances.  He further argues that his consent was involuntary, given 
his level of education and intelligence.  Whether the consent to search was voluntary is a 
question of fact that we review for clear error.  United States v. Williams, 898 F.3d 323, 
332 (3d Cir. 2018).  We will not disturb the District Court’s finding “unless it is (1) 
completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility, or 
(2) bears no rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
A warrantless search of a residence is “presumptively unreasonable.”  Payton v. 
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).  But no warrant or probable cause is necessary to 
search a residence when an individual with authority over the premises voluntarily 
consents to the search.  United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169-71 (1974); United 
States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 231 (3d Cir. 2011).  In determining whether a consent 
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was voluntary, we examine the totality of the circumstances and focus on several factors, 
including: “age, education, and intelligence of the subject; whether the subject was 
advised of his or her constitutional rights; the length of the encounter; ... the use of 
physical punishment[;] ... [and] [t]he setting in which the consent was obtained[.]”  
Stabile, 633 F.3d at 231 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  “[W]hen the 
district court’s decision is based on testimony that is coherent and plausible ... there can 
almost never be a finding of clear error.”  United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 440 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 441 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
Here, we discern no clear error in the District Court’s finding that Kellam 
voluntarily consented to a search of the Green Street residence.  After considering 
testimony from Lau and Kellam, the Court found Lau’s testimony more credible.  There 
is nothing to indicate error, let alone clear error, in that conclusion, so we take the Court’s 
factual findings concerning consent to be accurate. 
According to Lau’s testimony, credited by the District Court, he asked for and 
obtained Kellam’s consent to search the residence.  Even though Kellam says that he only 
has a ninth-grade education and suffers from a learning disability, Lau testified that 
Kellam appeared to be coherent and to understand the questions he was asking.  True, 
Kellam was in custody and surrounded by law enforcement authorities when Lau asked 
for consent, but we must consider those facts in light of the totality of the circumstances.  
Lau informed Kellam “that he had an absolute right to deny that consent ... [and] compel 
[Lau] ... to make application to the Court based on the facts involved in this case for a 
search warrant.” (App. at 13.)  Despite that, Kellam decided that he wanted to cooperate.  
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He gave his consent, and, at the residence, Kellam gave his key to Lau to open the rear 
door.  Kellam then directed the authorities to the locations of the drugs, firearm, and cash 
that were later recovered.   
In addition, Lau obtained consent from Smith to search the residence.  As a 
cohabitant of the residence, she too had authority to provide consent for the search.  
Stabile, 633 F.3d at 231.  Again, the finding that she gave consent is not clearly 
erroneous. 
C. Trial Testimony 
 
Kellam challenges Lau’s testimony at trial as improperly providing expert 
evidence.  Kellam notes that Lau was not admitted as an expert, and he argues that the 
Court erred by allowing Lau to effectively testify as an expert and further erred by failing 
to give a cautionary instruction to the jury regarding the dual role of Lau as a fact witness 
and expert witness.3  We review Kellam’s objections to Lau’s trial testimony for plain 
error because he did not preserve them in the District Court.  “To demonstrate plain error, 
an appellant must establish that (1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious; (3) 
the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it 
affected the outcome of the district court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affects 
the fairness, integrity[,] or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  United States v. 
                                              
3  Specifically, Kellam points to Lau’s testimony regarding the street value of 
crack cocaine, how drugs are divided and packaged to be sold on the street, the rarity of 
finding crack cocaine users to have crack with them because they have an urge to 
consume it, the common practice in the drug culture of having a gun for protection, the 
jargon used by those in the drug culture, and Lau’s conclusion that, based on all the 
evidence, the gun was Kellam’s.   
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Fulton, 837 F.3d 281, 294 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks, citations, and 
alterations omitted).  Kellam argues that the error was plain and the resulting prejudice 
was “self-evident” because Lau “was permitted to give expert testimony regarding his 
own investigation,” which “unreasonably provided an aura of reliability to his testimony 
... [and] likely provided more weight to the jury than it deserved[,]” and that the 
“[D]istrict [C]ourt did nothing to minimize the prejudice.”  (Opening Br. at 21.)  We 
disagree. 
Even assuming that the District Court erred and that the error was plain, Kellam’s 
arguments cannot survive plain error review because he cannot establish that the error 
affected his substantial rights or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.  That conclusion rests on the following four reasons. 
First, although Lau was not formally admitted as an expert witness, his trial 
testimony about his experience in investigating drug crimes demonstrates that he would 
have qualified as an expert, if tendered, and therefore would have been allowed to 
provide that testimony.  Lau said that he had worked for the Harrisburg Police 
Department for approximately twenty-four years, five of which were with the Vice Unit, 
which handles drug-related criminal activity.  He thus had extensive relevant experience.  
Second, Kellam had a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine Lau and challenge any 
of the purportedly improper testimony.  Third, in the charge to the jury, the District Court 
repeatedly emphasized the jury’s role in deciding the facts, and, in particular, the Court 
advised the jury how to consider testimony from law enforcement witnesses.  (See S.A. at 
404 (“The fact that a witness is employed as a law enforcement officer does not mean 
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that his or her testimony necessarily deserves more or less consideration or greater or 
lesser weight than that of any other witness.”).)  Fourth and finally, the alleged error did 
not affect other evidence at trial, such as the informant’s testimony about his involvement 
in the investigation and how he had bought drugs from Kellam.   
Kellam’s arguments amount to sheer speculation that the outcome of his 
proceedings would have been different if Lau had not given testimony that could be 
called expert evidence.  Cf. United States v. DeMuro, 677 F.3d 550, 562 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(assuming arguendo that testimony was improperly admitted expert witness opinion, but 
nevertheless concluding there was no plain error because any error did not satisfy the 
fourth prong of plain error review).  There is, however, no basis to conclude that Lau’s 
testimony negatively affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial 
proceedings in this case.  Kellam has thus failed to show plain error warranting reversal.4 
D. The Two-Level Sentencing Enhancement For Obstruction Of Justice 
 
Finally, Kellam challenges his sentence as improperly including a two-level 
enhancement for obstruction of justice under § 3C1.1 of the guidelines.  The District 
                                              
4  Kellam also argues that the District Court violated Federal Rule of Evidence 
704(b) when it let Lau testify that, “[b]ased on [his] training and experience and being 
involved in drug-related investigations, based on there being weapons involved with 
those drug-related investigations, circumstantially based on all the facts involved in this 
case, [he] had strong reason to suspect that that [firearm] was, in fact [Kellam’s] 
weapon.”  (App. at 191.)  But we decline to consider that argument because it was raised 
in a one-sentence footnote in his opening brief and was not explained or developed.  See 
United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 162-63 (3d Cir. 2008) (concluding issue was 
waived because a “one-sentence footnote” was insufficient to raise it in an opening brief); 
see also John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 
1997) (“[A]rguments raised in passing (such as, in a footnote), but not squarely argued, 
are considered waived.”). 
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Court applied that enhancement based on the PSR’s recommendation and trial testimony 
showing that Kellam persuaded the informant to provide a statement to Kellam’s lawyer 
that the three drug transactions did not occur.  Kellam preserved his objection to the 
§ 3C1.1 enhancement  and argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the 
enhancement and that any purported obstruction was immaterial because the statement 
was never used by Kellam at trial.   
For purposes of applying a sentencing enhancement, district courts must find facts 
by a preponderance of the evidence.  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 568 (3d Cir. 
2007).  We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s construction of the 
guidelines, and we review the factual findings underlying a sentence for clear error.  
United States v. Douglas, 885 F.3d 145, 150 n.3 (3d Cir. 2018).  Section § 3C1.1 permits 
a two-level sentencing enhancement when “the defendant willfully obstructed or 
impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to 
the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction[.]”  
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (2016).5  Obstructive conduct under § 3C1.1 includes committing 
perjury as well as “threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing a ... 
witness.”  Id. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(A), (B); see also United States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 
180 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming two-level obstruction of justice enhancement when 
defendant attempted to coerce a witness into signing a false exculpatory letter). 
Here, the District Court did not err in applying the obstruction of justice 
enhancement based on the informant’s testimony that Kellam had asked him to lie.  At 
                                              
5  As stated in the PSR, we apply the 2016 version of the guidelines.   
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trial, the informant testified that Kellam approached him at his home and requested that 
he provide a false statement to Kellam’s defense lawyer that the drug transactions had not 
occurred.  And the informant in fact followed through on Kellam’s request.  t is of no 
moment that the false statement was not shown to the jury.  What matters is that there 
was ample evidence to support the Court’s finding that Kellam attempted to influence a 
witness’s testimony when he approached the informant and asked him to provide false 
evidence.  On this record, the District Court rightly applied the § 3C1.1 enhancement.6 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Kellam’s 
motion to suppress and will also affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence. 
                                              
6  Because we will affirm the District Court’s decision to apply the § 3C1.1 
enhancement based on Kellam persuading the informant to provide a false statement to 
Kellam’s attorney, we do not address the other ground for the enhancement, namely, the 
perjured testimony Kellam allegedly gave at the suppression hearing.   
